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DIA-TRIBE 
Mark V. Tushnet* 
.AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By Laurence H. Tribe. Min-
eola, N.Y.: The Foundation Press. 1978. Pp. lxix, 1204. $23.50. 
It is hard to emerge from Professor Tribe's enterprise without the 
feeling that Philip Roth's Dr. Spielvogel has offered the last word on 
the subject: "So .... Now vee may perhaps to begin. Yes?" 1 The 
treatise has been criticized from the right2 and praised from the 
center, 3 and I suppose my comments will inevitably be taken as the 
view from the left. I prefer, however, to think of them as coming 
from, say, the north - from a direction unrelated to the conven-
tional liberal-conservative continuum. I shall examine Professor 
Tribe's work with the aim of showing that its premises are hopelessly 
contradictory. The popular allegiance to those premises demon-
strates the need for a major reorientation of constitutional theory.4 
Professor Tribe's treatise is organized around four premises. 
First, the aim of the Constitution of the United States is to secure 
justice. Second, the Constitution does in fact - or can fairly be in-
terpreted to - approximate the accomplishment of justice. Third, 
the Supreme Court should interpret the Constitution so as to pro-
mote justice. The first two of these premises are largely uncontrover-
sial. Rawls tells us that justice is the first virtue of institutions. 5 And, 
as I will argue by example in the next Section, the flexibility of legal 
reasoning and the variety of the available precedents certainly pro-
vide enough room for the Constitution to be interpreted to promote 
justice. The third premise is the one around which the standard con-
troversies in constitutional theory rage. I shall not rehearse those 
controversies here; Professor Tribe comes close to acknowledging 
that his third premise is independent of the first two, and gives only 
the weakest of arguments to support it. 
Although I shall deal with difficulties in Professor Tribe's inter-
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. B.A. 1967, Harvard University; J.D., M.A. 
1971, Yale University. - Ed. 
1. P. ROTH, PORTNOY'S COMPLAINT 274 (1969). 
2. See Nagel, Book Review, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1174 (1979). 
3. See Ginsburg, Book Review, 92 HARv. L. REv. 340 (1978). 
4. I have suggested elsewhere the direction that such a reorientation might take. See 
Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: Constitutional Law Scholarship in the Seven• 
ties, 57 TEXAS L. REV. 1307 (1979); Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship, 15 J. SocY, Pun. 
TCHRS. LAW 20 (1980). 
5. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (1971). See also U.S. CONST. preamble. 
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pretation of his third premise, the fundamental contradictions within· , 
the treatise emanate from the fourth premise: that relatively rec~nt 
Supreme Court decisions establish doctrines that are reasonable ap-
proximations of justice. As we shall see, it matters little whether we 
take 1968, the end of the Warren era, or 1980 as the date for examin-
-ing constitutional doctrine; Professor Tribe tends to choose the later 
date and then to explain why current doctrine is almost as good as 
Warren Court doctrine. From what we know about the rationality 
with which the Court decides cases,6 the fourth premise is either 
wildly implausible or rests on an invisible hand mechanism of truly 
awesome power. Although Professor Tribe's enterprise might be un-
derstood as an argument for constructing such a me~hanism, he does 
not do so and indeed talks in terms that are inconsistent with uie 
invisible hand approach. 
My argument is designed to show that one cannot treat constitu-
tional law as establishing principles of justice. In Section II, I take 
the first three premises seriously and explore what might happen if 
we encouraged the Supreme Court to articulate principles of justi~e 
in its constitutional decisions. I argue that it is impossible to join the 
· fourth premise to what that exploration reveals, and that only a dif-
ferent kind of constitutional theory from Professor Tribe's can do the 
job he thinks should be done. 
I. PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND THE CONSTITUTION 
Suppose we agreed with Professor Tribe that the Supreme,Court 
should interpret the Constitution so that constitutional doctrine 
stated principles of justice. In this Section, I shall examine what a 
political philosopher might say about two substantive areas1 eq~al 
protection and federalism, and how a political-philosopher-turn,ed-
judge might interpret the Constitution in line with Professor Tribe's 
first three premises. I shall also compare the results with what Pro-
fessor Tribe himself says. I shall argue that there may be a gross 
disparity between the two efforts, and that the possibility of disparity 
can be eliminated only by adopting Professor Tribe's fourth premise. 
In doing so, however, those who follow Professor Tribe are commit-
ted to specific positions on issues that remain controversial among 
political philosophers. Perhaps the philosophers are wrong; perhaps 
Edmund Burke was a better philosopher than John Rawls and Rob-
ert Nozick. I invoke Burke to suggest a very powerful conservative 
strain in Professor Tribe's work. Section II examines another aspect 
of Professor Tribe's conservatism, and my Conclusion sugg~ts its 
sources. · 
6. See generally B. WOODWARD & s. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979). 
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A. The Just .Distribution of Wealth: State Action and the Equal 
Protection Clause 
Someone who learned political philosophy from Professor Tribe, 
or from reading law reviews, would be surprised to learn that the 
central issue in political philosophy today, as it has been for at least a 
century, is not whether or to what extent freedom of expression is 
required, not whether abortion is morally permissible, not whether 
remedial action that takes race explicitly into account is justified. In 
many ways, indeed, those issues are shadows cast by the real one 
that has animated philosophical discussion: put bluntly, the real is-
sue is which social-economic system, capitalism or socialism, justice 
demands.7 That is what John Rawls and Robert Nozick are con-
cerned with, and what they and their acolytes have to say about 
other questions is largely derived from premises constructed to give 
them leverage on that issue. 
I take it that I do not have to say much about what capitalism is, 
but I must say something about socialism. For the purposes of what 
follows, I take socialism to be a system with two predominate char-
acteristics: substantial though not necessarily complete equality in 
the distribution of material wealth among all in the society,8 and 
substantial though not necessarily complete control by the society, 
acting through appropriate forms of collective action, of how people 
invest their material resources, especially when certain investments 
threaten to disturb equality in wealth distribution. I want to begin 
with the hypothesis, which I know is outrageous to American law-
yers, that socialism is required by principles of justice; perhaps the 
outrage can be diminished by emphasizing again that what I treat as 
7. Capitalism and socialism can take many forms, of course. Rawls in particular contends 
that principles of justice can be satisfied in systems of welfare capitalism or modest socialism. 
See J. RAWLS, supra note 5, at 273-74. For my purposes, it is unnecessary to specify more 
particularly what forms of capitalism or socialism are at stake. According to Rawls, the choice 
is indeterminate only behind the veil of ignorance, at what he treats as the stage of constitu-
tion-making. Given information about the real world, which of course the Supreme Court has, 
the choice is determined in Rawls's scheme. Thus, Professor Tribe's third premise bars him 
from saying that the choice between capitalism or socialism should be left to legislatures. In 
addition, unless the Court can specify the choice, the enterprise of linking the Constitution and 
distributive justice becomes completely uninteresting. With compensation, the state can expro-
priate at will, and can then redefine for the future what present holders of wealth can do with it 
(pp. 463-65). Perhaps it is not as odd as it first seems that Professor Tribe appears to say that 
the Constitution may limit - for reasons of autonomy and equality, terms that the discussion 
of the state action doctrine below suggests are surrogates for private property - the legisla-
ture's ability to socialize property (p. 465). That reinforces the conclusion drawn above about 
what the third premise entails. It also, not so incidentally, supports my later arguments about 
Professor Tribe's conservatism. 
8. I should note in passing another anomaly. Most political theories are universalistic, in 
that they prescribe rules for action in societies of people generally. In this light, a work on 
American constitutional law that is said to be guided by political philosophy is decidedly odd. 
If the limitation were taken seriously, it would lead to far more troublesome implications than 
Professor Tribe realizes. For a fine discussion, see J. DUNN, WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY IN 
THE FACE OF THE FUTURE 55-79 (1979). 
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a hypothesis has been and remains a conclusion drawn by some 
respected philosophers.9 How then could a socialist judge interpret 
the Constitution to do justice? 
In light of my definition of socialism, she would have to develop 
two doctrines, one that specified a distribution of wealth and one 
that allowed collective control of investment. It is not accidental, as 
a certain element in the socialist camp would say, that she would in 
fact have those doctrines at hand. Indeed, she could summarize a 
complex argument by saying, "Socialism follows from Shelley v. 
Kraemer and Gr!lftn v. Illinois." Those familiar with the standard 
efforts in constitutional law courses to confine those cases may need 
no elaboration, but for those whose memories of the argument have 
faded, I shall expand it a bit. 
Shelley v. Kraemer10 held that the substantive requirements of 
the fourteenth amendment came into play when a state court sought 
to enforce a racially restrictive covenant in a deed of land between 
two private parties. Of course, the case can be read narrowly, as one 
involving race and a willing seller and buyer whose non-discrimina-
tory decisions were blocked by judicial enforcement of the covenant. 
But it can also be read broadly, as holding that state action exists, 
and the substantive requirements of the Constitution are implicated, 
whenever a court stands ready to enforce rights created by private 
agreement. Now suppose the socialist judge confronts this case: The 
People's Power Collective, enraged by the investment and pricing 
policies of the Detroit Metropolitan Edison Company, invades the 
Company's power plant and starts producing and distributing elec-
tricity according to new criteria.11 The Company seeks an injunction 
directing the Collective to leave the plant. Obviously, the judge sees, 
Shelley v. Kramer means that the injunction would be state action; 
whatever she does will affect the distribution of wealth in the society, 
and she therefore must decide which resulting distribution the equal 
protection clause requires. 
Actually, the judge has a second arrow in her quiver of prece-
dents. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority12 held that state ac-
tion exists where "[t]he State has so far insinuated· itself into a 
position of interdependence" with the nominally private action "that 
it must be recognized as a joint participant."13 Burton emphasizes 
that the question of interdependence depends on the facts, and the 
9. See J. RAWLS, supra note 5, at 273-74. 
10. 335 U.S. l (1948). 
11. There are precedents, even in the United States. See F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, POOR · 
PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS 55 (1979). Of course, the typical response has been coercive repression, 
but in such instances the lawsuit involving the Collective would simply take another form, 
seeking damages for false arrest and assault, for example. 
12. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
13. 365 U.S. at 725. 
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socialist judge realizes that, on standard interpretations of the facts 
about Metropolitan Edison, there is no interdependence. But facts 
can be described with varying abstraction, and the judge decides to 
talk about the interdependence of the state and the business commu-
nity, of which the relationship between Michigan and Metropolitan 
Edison is but one instance. She argues that the state depends on 
business confidence to stabilize its environment so revenue will be 
generated regularly, and that the business community depends on 
the state to provide a ·secure framework for profitable transactions. 14 
Is there anything wrong with those arguments? There are obvi-
ously some monumental objections of a legal realist sort. Justices 
Vinson and Clark were no socialists, and they surely did not intend 
Shelley and Burton to lay the foundations for socialism. Further, if 
the socialist judge actually writes the opinion I have sketched, the 
probability of reversal on appeal is vanishingly close to one. But 
realist objections will not count against Tribe, as should be clear 
from his tendentious, or in his own words "unconventional" and 
"problematic," (p. 313 n.28) account of National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 15 a decision that reeks of the American Enterprise Institute 
but that Professor Tribe treats as recognizing rights to "basic govern-
ment services" (p. 313). What matters, then, is what judges write, 
not what they think, and Shelley and Burton can fairly be used as the 
socialist judge wants. 
I admit that I have not fully developed the socialist judge's argu-
ment. She has at hand, however, some important research aids: 
commentary on the cases that says, for example, that Shelley cannot 
mean what it said, because if it did we would have socialism, and 
therefore continues with suggestions for limiting the case.16 All she 
has to do is stop after the first part of that commentary. But our 
judge is not just a socialist; she is a conscientious and honest judge as 
well and must worry about whether Shelley and Burton remain good 
law in all their implications. As to Shelley, the answer is clear. Al-
though the Court has never faced up to its implications and has de-
cided cases that would have gone the other way had Shelley been at 
the center of the argument, the implications of the case have never 
been overtly repudiated, and the case is still cited with approval. 
The only exception is Evans v. Abney, 17 allowing state law to author-
ize reversion of a bequest to residuary legatees if the discriminatory 
intent of the testator cannot be fulfilled. Abney can be fairly treated 
14. See Block, The Ruling Closs .Does Not Rule, 33 SOCIALIST REVOLUTION 7 (1977). 
15. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), discussed at pp. 308-18. 
16. See Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes far a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 
(1962); Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority - A Case Without Precedent, 61 
COLUM L. REV. 1458 (1961). 
17. 396 U.S. 435 (1970). 
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as an aberration, or as dealing with the limited sphere of testamen-
tary disposition of property. 
The situation as to Burton is more complicated. Recent cases 
seem to have narrowed what will count as interdependence, 18 and 
Burton has tended to merge with a separate line of authority - that 
state action exists where an ostensibly private actor performs a pub-
lic function. 19 The current law is that a public function is one over 
which the state has traditionally exercised a monopoly.20 A consci-
entious judge can deal with the narrowing of interdependence, as I 
have suggested, by arguing that it occurred when the Court used a 
less abstract description of the facts, and that such a description does 
not foreclose the business-confidence argument she has made. The 
public function cases are harder for the conscientious socialist judge. 
One line of defense is to recast the public function, from providing 
electricity or zoning land to determining legal rights and duties. 
That function has been, and indeed by definition must be, a state 
monopoly. In this way, the public function cases become a straight-
forward deduction from Shelley. Here the only obstacle is the outra-
geous case of United States v. Kras,21 of which Professor Tribe 
disapproves precisely on monopoly grounds (p. 1009).22 
Actually, at this stage the judge can rely on Professor Tribe even 
more directly. His chapter on the state action doctrine treats it as an 
"anti-doctrine" (p. 1147). I will do no more than point to the rhetor-
ical excesses23 and the opacity of the formulations in the chapter, 24 
before noting that, to Professor Tribe, the state action question col-
lapses into the question on the merits: "It is a problem . . . whose 
solutions must currently be sought in perceptions of what we do not 
want particular constitutional provisions to control" (p. 1174).25 
Thus, the socialist judge can move confidently to the equal protec-
tion question, for if Metropolitan Edison's property rights are impor-
tant; there is no state action, and if the Collective's forcible 
18. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
19. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
20. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). 
21. 409 U.S. 434 (1973). 
22. See also pp. 1120-22 for a different criticism. 
23. I would appreciate hearing from a reader who can explain how "[c)haos ... may itself 
be a form of order,'' p. 1149, without invoking the second law of thermodynamics. 
24. See, e.g., pp. 1159, 1160. On p. i158: "The s!ate action requirement fixes a frame of 
reference. The substantive constitutional right at issue initially determines the parameters of 
this frame. Ultimately, however, it is the frame itself which determines the relevance of the 
right to the inquiry." Professor Tribe must have caught more than a glimpse of his back in 
front of him as he rounded the last bend in that circle. 
25. I do not suppose that the word "currently" is intended to suggest that at some future 
time the problem will receive a different solution. Rather, it suggests that definitions of sub-
stantive rights will vary over time, and thus points to the importance, subliminal in this in-
stance, of the fourth premise. 
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redistribution of property is justified, there is state action. This ap-
proach, which Professor Tribe suggests is novel (pp. 1160-61), simply 
restates the balancing test proposed by Professor Henkin and 
others.26 Unfortunately, in creating a polar case for that balance, the 
law professors' parade of horribles - black children trooping across 
the bigot's lawn on their way to school, invading his living room27 -
simultaneously assumes that private property must be taken as a 
given - the horribles would not be horrible otherwise - and as-
similates the bigot's lawn to Metropolitan Edison's power plant, as if 
a principled socialism could not draw the obvious lines. 
On the merits of the case, the leading precedent is Gr!lfin v. llli-
nois,28 in which the Court held that a state must provide a trial tran-
script to indigents seeking to appeal their convictions where it 
requires transcripts for such appeals. Gr!lfin means that the state 
may not rely solely on the market criterion, ability to pay, as a basis 
for allocating at least some goods. Gr!lfin opens two questions for 
discussion: what goods must be allocated by non-market criteria and 
to what extent must considerations other than ability to pay govern 
the allocation of goods? Once again, the socialist judge can rely on 
the commentators who explore, sometimes with excitement29 and 
sometimes with dread,30 the implications of Gr!lfin. 
The Supreme Court tried to limit the goods subject to Griffin in 
the school .finance case, which said that it applied only to goods 
(rights) "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."31 
As Justice Marshall there points out, however, Griffin is unnecessary 
for such goods; the constitutional right itself, standing alone and un-
supported by notions of equality, prohibits allocation according to 
the market. Thus, Griffin must apply to important, or in the terms 
Professor Michelman draws from Rawls, basic goods, among which 
are the material necessities of life. 
The doctrinal formulation in the school finance case obscures a 
more important element in the case: the Court's implicit acknowl-
edgement that Griffin's scope was broad indeed. The case repeatedly 
emphasized that no one contended that the education provided in 
26. See Henkin, supra note 16. 
27. Professor Tribe spots the parade on p. 1170. 
28. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
29. See, e.g., Michelman, Foreword· On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). 
30. See, e.g., Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 
SUP. CT. REV. 41. 
31. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973). In light of my com-
ments in note 35 iefra, I should state that I was one of Justice Marshall's Jaw clerks during the 
term in which the school finance case was decided. I was only peripherally involved in the 
work on Justice Marshall's opinion. See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 6, at 
258-59. 
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property-tax-poor districts fell below some mm1m11m level, thus 
coupling a broad scope for Gr!ffin with a limiting answer to the sec-
ond question. Because we are concerned with Professor Tribe's 
premises, we can put aside the fruitless controversy over standards of 
review - strict scrutiny, minimal rationality, and all that. For, by 
his third premise, the Court must decide whether a distribution of 
wealth is justified, and cannot, except by arguments I will discuss in 
the next section, rely on another agency's conclusion that the distri-
bution is justified. The limiting answer to the second question has 
generally been taken to be Professor Michelman's: a distribution of 
wealth is justified as long as it meets minimum standards for satisfy-
ing just wants for basic goods. Professor Michelman constructed his 
test by blending Rawlsian moral philosophy with decided Supreme 
Court cases; that is, he relied on the third and fourth premises. 
Michelman's minimum protection approach does specify one form 
of political philosophy, but only the fourth premise justifies that 
form instead of a more radical equalization approach. 
My hypothesis in this Section has been that justice demands radi-
cal equality. Gr!ffin can be read to support that result, but later cases 
seem to stand in the way. The socialist judge has several responses 
to cases like the school finance case. First, they ~xplicitly rely on an 
improper theory of judicial review; by deferring to the legislature 
and not assessing the justice of the distribution of wealth, they erro-
neously rejected the third premise. Second, they were simply wrong; 
to the extent that they relied on a theory of distributive justice, they 
relied on one that was not supported by careful moral philosophy. 
Finally, and I think most interesting, invocation of norms of distrib-
utive justice by the courts is, as I argue in Section II, fundamentally 
a political act: it makes sense only if the political circumstances will 
allow the decision to be used as part of an extended political process 
that will ultimately achieve justice. The socialist judge can therefore 
treat the limiting cases as sensible decisions in light of their political 
circumstances. But obviously something has changed when a peo-
ple's collective takes over a power plant, and it may be politically 
appropriate to invoke the egalitarian standards demanded by princi-
ples of justice. 
Now we have to see what Professor Tribe says. He begins with a 
summary whose terms indicate his sympathies. The Warren Court, 
he says, used "ardent rhetoric of equal justice for the poor, rhetoric 
which promised more than even the Warren Court had delivered," 
and its decisions were "informed and perhaps generated" by an 
"imaginative compassion for the plight of the poor" (pp. 1098-99). 
He then reviews the decisions that are consistent with broad readings 
of Gr!ffin. When he discusses the later decisions, Professor Tribe 
criticizes their logic and their premises, suggesting that he would un-
derstand the socialist judge's second response to the limiting cases. 
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But his concluding summary takes back what one might have 
' thought Professor Tribe had given. He first explains the cases as re-
fusing to deprive the rich of what their money can purchase, which is 
a fair enough account but which, I confess, has no obvious connec-
t_ion to justice absent the fourth premise. Then he concludes: 
What emerges from the decisions of the past several years, then, is a 
wavering commitment to maintain for the poor access to criminal jus-
tice and the political process; a possible, but not openly professed or 
entirely consistent, belief in protection for the poor against the most 
severe forms of deprivation with respect to education, nutrition, and 
· welfare; and a determined, occasionally even activist, though again not 
openly proclaimed, commitment to preserve for the non-poor ways of 
purchasing distance and distinction from the less fortunate - to pre-
serve, in effect, plenty of room at the top, without wholly abandoning 
P!Otection at the bottom. 
The vision animating the mix of aspirations is plainly not an egali-
tarian one, but it is not without its own elements of decency and con-
cern; whatever the doctrinal stains, the Burger Court will not refuse 
lifelines to those about to drown, even if it will throw them from a 
point perched safely above the disquieting signs of distress - a point 
from which the struggle to survive may not always be visible at all. 
Whether the equal protection of the laws can survive this transfor-
-mation into minimal protection of the laws, with some of us very much 
more equal than others, remains to be seen. It will depend in part on 
just ftow minimal the protection provided at the bottom turns out to be. 
_ But it may also depend on the viability of a system that separates lib-
erty from equality, and separates both from fraternity. [Pp. 1135-36]. 
All that is well and good (although one wonders when lifelines 
will be thrown if the throwers cannot see the struggle). We know 
from it that Professor Tribe is fair-minded and even-handed, and 
that his heart is in the right place (that is, on his sleeve). But the 
tension between the third and fourth premises is evident, unless we 
agree that distributive justice demands only that lifelines be thrown . 
. There ~re reasons to think that it demands more. 
I have been sketching what might be called a direct argument for 
socialism, invoking only standards of distributive justice or equality. 
There is an indirect argument for socialism as well, invoking stan-
dards of liberty. That argument, I believe, seriously reduces the de-
gree to which minimum protection or lifeline theories of distributive 
justice are plausible. Here too a moral philosopher could use 
Supreme Court cases to illustrate the argument, though not to sup-
: port it. The argument assumes that basic liberties - to speak, vote, 
and so on - ought to be preserved, and then claims, on the basis of 
supstantial empirical evidence, that significant inequalities in the dis-
tribution of material wealth make it impossible to preserve those lib-
·-
March 1980] .Dia-Tribe 703 
erties.32 An incidental example can be found in the absence of 
freedom of speech in the workplace, so that whistleblowers may be 
fired at their employers' will, a result that I suspect would be hard to 
support under any plausible moral theory. But the examples from 
contemporary constitutional law are themselves important. In Buck-
ley v. Valeo 33 the Court held unconstitutional limits on individual 
expenditures on behalf of candidates for political office, and in First 
National Bank v. Bellotti34 it struck down expenditure limitations on 
corporate promotion of political views. Although Professor Tribe ar-
gues that the decisions can be limited (1979 Supp., p. 59 n.14), their 
message for those who find the indirect argument for socialism per-
suasive is that the fourth premise must be rejected, for the Court has, 
as Professor Tribe acknowledges, embedded in constitutional law a 
prohibition on legislative efforts to reduce the power that wealth 
brings to its owners (p. 1135). 
The Court in Bellotti was seriously divided, and one can con-
clude from. that fact alone that the first three premises are, at this 
point, unimpaired: the materials available for constitutional deci-
sion would allow us to interpret the Constitution so that it embodied 
principles of justice.35 But those three premises yield indeterminate 
results. It is only the fourth premise that allows Professor Tribe to 
get anywhere at all in his work. Yet it should be clear by now how 
ideo\pgical that premise is. The commentary attempting to limit 
Sheffey and Burton, and the recent monopolization cases, are explic-
itly animated by concern that prior state action doctrine might be 
used to socialize private property. The lesson of Bellotti is equally 
clear. In the absence of the fourth premise, a normative theorist 
might simply reject those concerns as wrong. Given the fourth 
premise, though, we must conclude that only capitalism is justified 
by political philosophy. 
Perhaps, however, I should not take the fourth premise as seri-
ously as I do. What I call a premise, after all, may simply be an 
artifact of Professor Tribe's enterprise: if one wants to write a trea-
32. The argument is most forcefully made in C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 
(1977), cited, with the author's name misspelled, in 1979 Supp., p. 77 n.12. 
33. 424 U.S. l (1976). 
34. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
35. A footnote on the ethics of treatise-writing is warranted. After Bellotti, the City of 
Boston argued that it, a municipal corporation, had to be allowed to spend money in a political 
campaign; Justice Brennan, who dissented in Bellotti, turned the screws on the majority in 
issuing a stay so that the city could do so. City of Boston v. Anderson, 439 U.S. 1389 (1978). 
The Supreme Court denied plenary review after the election had ended. 439 U.S. 1060 (1979). 
In the 1979 Supplement, which notes Anderson at 57 n.4, Professor Tribe argues that several 
cases "may . . . represent . . . a deeper and wider trend in our constitutional law: municipal 
corporations are increasingly being differentiated from mere arms of the state itself." (1979 
Supp., p. 31 ). Readers could better assess that suggestion if they were told that Professor Tribe 
represented Boston in Anderson and other cases. See 47 U.S.L.W. 33?3 (Nov. 21, 1978). 
704 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 78:694 
tise on American constitutional law, instead of a work that is la-
belled moral philosophy, one is obliged to tell one's audience what 
current law is. I admit that there are elements in the treatise that do 
seem to be artifacts. The most notable is Professor Tribe's central 
organizing scheme. He presents "seven models of constitutional 
law'' on the first page as both heuristic and historical. It is hard to 
avoid the feeling that Professor Tribe uses those models in a rather 
forced way. The chapter on the state action doctrine, for example, is 
tacked on at the end; Model III (takings and the contract clause) 
occupies 17 pages; and Model VII (structural justice) occupies only 
10. Model III seems to be simply a way to combine in one chapter 
the discussion of two clauses that other text writers discuss in two. 
Model-building may thus be as much an attempt to differentiate Pro-
fessor Tribe's product from others as it is an intellectual enterprise. 
But the fourth premise is not the same kind of artifact; it is essen-
tial to Professor Tribe's work. My extended hypothetical case is 
designed to show that the first three premises yield only indetermi-
nate results without some external source of normative judgments. 
The third premise confines results tfwe have a theory of justice. But 
the currently fashionable way of developing such a theory is through 
systematic moral philosophy, not through examining what the 
Supreme Court has said. Professor Tribe in effect proposes an alter-
native: capitalism is required not because it satisfies standards of 
justice developed in systematic moral theory but because the 
Supreme Court has over time defended it. The fourth premise is the 
motor of this alternative, and is therefore a true premise. Indeed, it 
is an essential premise to any effort that uses decided cases as the 
framework for developing a law that is consistent with justice. Di-
verse and sometimes conflicting lines of precedent pervade every 
area of law, and the standard tools of legal reasoning allow us to use 
those lines to any end we choose. But then decided cases cannot 
guide us to justice: we must find it for the future either by moral 
philosophy alone or by agreeing that the law - as it is occasionally 
stated by judges who are not primarily moral philosophers - em-
bodies justice. 
The fourth premise might be defended as an essential element in 
a Dworkinian best theory of constitutional law, "morally the strong-
est" theory among those that provide a reasonably "good fit" with 
the decided cases, "particularly recent decisions."36 There are, how-
ever, two difficulties, each fatal to Professor Tribe's enterprise. First, 
the strongest available moral theory may still be extremely flaccid, 
and Professor Tribe's second and third premises demand something 
more than a flaccid moral theory. Second, the Shel/ey-Gr!ffin argu-
ment demonstrates that theories which, to the legal profession at 
36. Dworkin, Seven Critics, Il GA. L. REV. 1201, 1252 (1977). 
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least, are wildly eccentric, fit the cases well enough to be among 
those from which the best theory must be selected, especially if, as 
Dworkin permits, we may reject some decisions as mistakes. Then, 
however, we need arguments for the moral theory chosen as best that 
are independent of the decided cases, and it is precisely such argu-
ments that Professor Tribe's fourth premise precludes. 
The Burkean theme is, I think, the only way to make sense of 
Professor Tribe's work. I have argued elsewhere that Burkean con-
stitutional theory is impossible;37 it is enough here to allude to Pro-
fessor Bickel' s hints at such a theory as a way of suggesting the 
difficulty of the endeavor.38 One thing should be noted, though: if 
Professor Tribe's fourth premise commits him to a Burkean theory, I 
find it hard to understand his basis for criticizing any line of cases 
even as moderately as he does. That is, the Burkeanism of the fourth 
premise contradicts the rationalism with which ·Professor Tribe in-
fuses the third premise. 
B. Coordination and Institutionalism: Federalism 
The next step in my argument questions Professor Tribe's inter-
pretation of the third premise, but it is best made indirectly. The 
argument from liberty to socialism suggests that liberty can be pre-
served only if relatively small permanent combinations of wealth 
and therefore of political power are allowed. But that raises ques-
tions about the ability of socialist society to produce levels of mate-
rial well-being that require large-scale activity. A socialist must 
therefore give some account of how small units can coordinate their 
activities. 
In constitutional law, that account is provid.ed by the law of fed-
eralism, whose concern is precisely how we can assure sufficient 
power in the national government to guarantee adequate coordina-
tion without at the same time concentrating power so much that lib-
erty is threatened. Political philosophers have suggested two 
methods to reach that end; American constitutional law is interesting 
here because the Framers attempted to devise a third method, whose 
failure is instructive. The philosophers say that coordination can be 
accomplished either by a rule requiring unanimous agreement 
before action can be taken or by a rule of majority agreement.39 In 
the American setting, those rules are mirrored in the choice between 
a confederation of states and a federal nation. 
37. See Tushnet, JJarkness on the Edge of Town: 'flze Contributions of John Hart Ely to 
Constitutional 'flzeory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1039-42 (1980). 
38. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975). 
39. Nozick argues for the unanimity rule and Rawls for majority rule at the legislative 
stage, though he requires unanimity at the constitutional stage .. 
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The Framers, of course, rejected the unanimity rule,40 and con-
temporary constitutional law therefore provides little insight into the 
philosophers' problems. But it might be possible to use the institu-
tion of judicial review as a mechanism for determining the subjects 
as to which unanimity was required in a mixed system. Had it been 
used that way, we could look at the cases for guidance on the philo-
sophical issue. However, the Court has, with brief exception, con-
sistently followed the majority rule approach in its federalism 
decisions, treating congressional power as plenary in cases involving 
national power and assuming that congressional decisions can over-
ride local decisions in cases involving state power. The exception is 
the period from 1896 to 1936, when the Court imposed federalism 
constraints on the exercise of national power. No coherent doctrine 
emerged during that period, nor has one come since.41 
Two conclusions may follow from the constitutional law of feder-
alism. The territorial units that underlie federalism in the United 
States may still be too large to guarantee both liberty and coordina-
tion; certainly the mental pictures one draws of Robert Nozick's uto-
pia and Roberto Unger's organic groups are those of units rather 
smaller than California. Then too, there may be a more general 
point. Professor Tribe's treatment of federalism obscures this point 
completely, even though it seems to be the only question about fed-
eralism that a moral philosopher would find interesting. Professor 
Tribe provides chapters on federalism whose primary analytic point 
is the inability of the Supreme Court to develop federalism restraints 
on national power even though federalism is designed to protect lib-
erty (in his Model I, of "Separated and Divided Powers") (pp. 1-4). 
Given the fourth premise, the emphasis on decided cases is unsur-
prising, but it comes close to abandoning the third premise. What 
would be of interest is something to which Professor Tribe alludes 
only in passing: the Court has its chance to talk about federalism 
and national power only when Congress has acted, and yet the con-
stitutional division of subjects between state and nation may be bet-
ter revealed if we look at what Congress does not do, that is, at 
subjects as to which, at least provisionally, coordination can be 
reached only by unanimous agreement (p. 224). The Court's failure 
to define when unanimity is required may mean that there is no nec-
essary connection between institutional arrangements such as judi-
cial review and the substantive requirements of justice. The next 
Section explores that general point drawn from Professor Tribe's 
treatment of federalism and the tensions between the third and 
fourth premises that his treatment reveals. 
40. Aficionados will note U.S. CONST. art. V, proviso 2. 
41. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
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II. JUSTICE AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
In this section I develop two challenges to the third premise. 
First, the Burkean theme makes it difficult to defend the interpreta-
tion of that premise which Professor Tribe follows; there are theories 
of justice that would not allow Professor Tribe to move from sub-
stantive principles of justice to the assertion that the Court should 
follow those principles. Second, and for me more interesting, even if 
one accepts Professor Tribe's notion of what justice requires, or in-
deed any theory of justice that specifies outcomes, one probably 
should not accept his assertion about what the Court should do; 
there are reasons to think that the outcomes will sometimes not be 
reached by that route. 
The first challenge is, in one of its forms, the general institution-
alist challenge to judicial review. Assuming that the Constitution is 
designed to secure justice, the challenge goes, what reason is there to 
think that the Supreme Court will better serve justice than legisla-
tures? Professor Tribe in essence ignores the challenge, and when it 
is stated in the ordinary way, I think he does so correctly. The ordi.:. 
nary form leads to a morass from which no one has emerged more 
enlightened, or enlightening, than before. For Professor Tribe, 
therefore, institutional concerns have only a limited relevance to 
substantive ones (p. 14). 
But he should not be let off so easily just because the ordinary 
form of the institutionalist challenge is unhelpful. There are indeed 
interpretations of justice to which institutional concerns have almost 
no relevance. These interpretations evaluate the outcomes of social 
activities according to some substantive criteria. Nozick calls them 
"patterned" theories of justice,42 and it is of course true that if one 
holds a patterned theory, in which only outcomes matter, one can 
move rather directly from theory to doctrine, subject to qualifica-
tions discussed below. But patterned theories are not the only ones 
available in political philosophy. For example, there are also what 
might be called process theories, in which outcomes are evaluated 
according to criteria that speak only to the manner in which the out-
comes were reached. Obviously, Professor Tribe's approach is ac-
ceptable only if some patterned theory, instead of some process 
theory, satisfies the requirements of justice. In a way, this difficulty 
recapitulates the underlying problem discussed in Section I. There 
we saw the odd consequences of assuming that the Supreme Court 
has resolved controversies that continue to excite political philoso-
phers; here we see Professor Tribe assuming that he has done the 
same, aided by "historical givens" about the Supreme Court (p. 12). 
I suspect that a serious Burkean could explain the connection be-
42. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 156 {1974). 
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tween judicial and academic behavior in an interesting way, but I 
know that, once again, Professor Tribe has not followed lines that 
would open if he attempted to defend his premises. 
Even as reformulated, the institutionalist challenge is rather 
uninteresting, because there appear to be no contemporary political 
philosophies that are purely process theories.43 For questions on 
which the majority (or the process specified by the theory) should 
not rule, then, one who accepts the first two premises will have to 
accept the third as well. Let us assume, therefore, that constitutional 
theory allows the Supreme Court to say that at least some legislative 
decisions are inconsistent with principles of justice. At this point the 
second challenge arises, for it does not follow that the Court should 
impose what justice requires. The challenge here is different from 
the institutionalist one, because we have assumed that it is permissi-
ble to override majoritarian or process decisions. Rather, the chal-
lenge is political. 
I think it helpful to invoke Rawls and the economic theory of 
second best here. Rawls, to whom Professor Tribe is obviously, and 
with good reason, attracted, develops a theory of justice that assumes 
a society in which the conditions of justice are almost secure.44 In 
such a society, it might make sense for a court to rectify the occa-
sional deviations from justice by directly imposing what justice re-
quires. But where the deviations from justice are substantial in 
degree and widespread. in scope, as they are in the contemporary 
United States under the theories of both Rawls and Nozick, such 
actions may not be sensible. The economic theory of second best 
holds that, where there are numerous deviations from the conditions 
that guarantee Pareto optimality, there is no reason, in general, to 
think that alleviating one deviation will yield outcomes that are 
more efficient than existed before; changes can be justified only by a 
detailed examination of the precise setting in which the occasion for 
decision arises. 
I do not know whether the analogy to political action has been 
rigorously developed, but it certainly has strong intuitive force. Acts 
that alleviate the immediate problem may, by reducing political 
pressure, delay the rectification of other, perhaps greater injustices. 
Examples of recent constitutional law from the campaign against 
segregation and from the welfare rights movement reveal the neces-
sity of careful political analysis: constitutional decisions like Brown 
v. Board of Education45 amplified the political forces seeking equal-
43. Burkean theory is completely undeveloped, probably because it is ultimately incoher-
ent too. My colleague Warren Lehman is currently attempting to resurrect what I call 
Burkean theory. 
44. See J. RAWLS, supra note 5, at 245-49. 
45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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ity, while decisions like Goldberg v. Kel!y46 at least arguably dimin-
ished those forces, first by deflecting them into a fruitless struggle 
against a bureaucracy that readily swallowed the Court-prescribed 
dose of due process without any change in symptoms, and second by 
bolstering the idea that fairness was not far away in the American 
welfare state. 
The socialist judge of Section I might, after political reflection, 
conclude that the circumstances did not favor a socialist revolution 
when the collective acted, and might therefore interpret the state 
i;i.ction doctrine or the equal protection clause to require that the re-
quested injunction be issued. That course is not an easy one to fol-
low. The judge must consciously decide to perpetuate an existing 
injustice that hurts real people present before her, so that an indefi-
nite but, it is hoped, larger number of people will be hurt less in the 
more or less distant future. The problem is not unfamiliar to politi-
cal philosophers, who have discussed it under the heading of "dirty 
hands."47 Professor Tribe treats it as a nonproblem, and perhaps the 
philosophers will someday prove him right. But the satisfaction with 
contemporary American society that is evident in the fourth premise, 
rather than serious philosophical reflection, animates the way Profes-
sor Tribe interprets the third premise. 
As these comments suggest, the third and fourth premises are 
linked, not by some rigorous logic, but by a more general way of 
thinking, which I like to think of as the Burkean conservative side of 
contemporary liberalism. Though liberals think differently, politics 
ain't beanbag, as has been said before. The politics of liberalism, as 
exemplified by Professor Tribe's work, are inherently conservative. 
They assume that contemporary American society approximates a 
just society; thus, both the fourth premise, which is explicit on the 
point, and the third premise, interpreted in the Rawlsian way dis-
cussed above, make sense. They also, and concomitantly, deny the 
need for massive and therefore probably violent changes in the struc-
ture of the society. In this respect, Professor Tribe is the quintessen-
tial liberal, a term that, it should be clear, is not one I regard as one 
of honor. Constitutional theory poses problems in political philoso-
phy; liberals take pains to construct their premises, which in the na-
ture of things receive almost no examination, so that those problems 
are obscured. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Tribe-trashing is something of a thing to do these days,48 and I 
46. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
47. Walzer, Political Action - The Problem of JJirty Hands, 2 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 
160 (1973). 
48. See, e.g., Bodine, Harvard's Hustler, Natl. L.J., Oct. 8, 1979, at 1, col. 2. 
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therefore want to emphasize that my final comments are directed at 
the present state of constitutional scholarship, of which Professor 
Tribe's treatise is, for these purposes, only an example. I hope that 
what has gone before raises a serious puzzle: how could so morally 
obtuse a work be taken so seriously? The answer can be found in 
Professor Tribe's ambition, which, like that of constitutional scholars 
generally, lies outside the world of scholarship and in the world of 
contemporary public affairs. Not that there is anything intrinsically 
wrong with ambition. Its rewards, enumerated by Ward Just as 
honor, power, riches, fame, and the love of women,49 are, with one 
obvious modification, nothing to be sneered at. Most of us have 
imagined ourselves as Justices of the Supreme Court, and Professor 
Tribe, whose chances are better than those of the rest of us, 50 would 
surely be a better Justice than many. 
The question, though, is to what activities the rewards of ambi-
tion accrue. In the world of public affairs, they accrue not necessar-
ily to intellectual substance. One who addresses the real questions of 
justice is by that fact alone disqualified from serious consideration 
for public position and influence, because raising those questions 
raises in tum questions about the worth of the positions that now 
exist, to be occupied or influenced. Under the circumstances, I take 
some pleasure, not however unmixed with regret, in noting that the 
Framers would have understood the phenomenon that Professor 
Tribe's work represents: they called it corruption.51 
49. W. JUST, HONOR, POWER, RICHES, FAME, AND THE LOVE OF WOMEN (1978). 
50. I do offer Professor Tribe two bits of gratuitous advice. The track record of appoint-
ments of academics to the Supreme Court is weak indeed, as some of Professor Tribe's own 
colleagues could tell him. And I pass on an observation by Judge Henry Friendly, who ought 
to know about this question: "Don't take one job expecting that it will lead to another." 
51. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1968). 
